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This paper examines the role buyout specialists play in structuring the debt
used to finance the LBO and in monitoring management in the post-LBO firm.
We find that when buyout specialists control the majority of the post-LBO
equity, the LBO transaction is likely to be financed with less short-term
and/or senior debt and less likely to experience financial distress. We also find
that buyout specialists have greater board representation on smaller boards,
suggesting that they actively monitor managers, and that for these
transactions, using debt with tighter terms does not significantly increase the
firm's performance. In contrast, in all other transactions using such debt does
significantly increase the firm's performance. These findings suggest that
active monitoring by a buyout specialist substitutes for tighter debt terms in
monitoring and motivating managers of LBOs.

1. Introduction
Jensen (1986 and 1989) argues that leverage buyout
transactions (LBOs) provide a “carrot” and “stick” mechanism to
ameliorate the agency costs associated with free cash flow. First,
managers' share ownership significantly increases, giving them
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incentives to work harder (the ‘carrot’). Second, firms borrow heavily
to finance the purchase of publicly held stock. The ensuing heavy debt
burden forces managers to efficiently run the company to avoid default
(the ‘stick’). Thus, a high debt level provides benefits that outweigh
the higher expected bankruptcy and agency costs normally associated
with high debt levels. In addition, third-party investors often acquire a
large equity stake in the LBO, giving these investors incentives to
motivate and monitor managers. Many studies have provided empirical
evidence that supports Jensen's arguments (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989;
Kaplan, 1989; Baker and Wruck, 1989; Smith, 1990; Denis, 1994;
Wruck, 1994). This study examines in more detail how the disciplining
benefits of debt vary with the type of LBO equity investors, which in
turn explains the cross-sectional variation in the structure of the debt
used to finance LBO transactions. In particular, we examine the role
buyout specialists play in structuring the debt to finance the LBO and
in monitoring management in the post-LBO firm.
In Jensen's argument (1986, p.324), it is not the total amount
of debt outstanding per se but rather the amount of “debt service
payments” per period that motivates managers to work harder. Thus,
the structure or terms of the debt play an important role in how
effectively debt motivates managers. Debt with a shorter maturity
increases the debt service payments per period and increases the
incentives for managers to work harder to increase firm value in the
early stages of the LBO. In addition, private or senior bank loans are
more likely to have restrictive covenants in the debt agreements
compared to publicly held subordinated or ‘junk’ bonds (see Smith and
Warner, 1979; James, 1987; Press and Weintrop, 1990; Begley, 1990;
and Gilson and Warner, 1996). Furthermore, private lenders are more
likely to closely monitor managers in the post-LBO firm than appointed
trustees of public issues of subordinated bonds (see Smith and
Warner, 1979; James, 1987; and Gilson and Warner, 1996). Thus,
when LBOs are financed with more short-term and/or senior debt than
with long-term and/or subordinate debt, debt is likely to play a more
important role in monitoring and motivating managers in the post-LBO
firm.
Apart from debt, managers or third-party equity investors are
another significant source of financing for LBOs. When third-party
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equity investors can actively monitor managers at a relatively low cost,
the benefits to using debt to monitor managers decline. Since
bankruptcy and debt agency costs reduce the return to these equity
investors, using debt to monitor managers can be expensive. Buyout
specialists, such as Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts (KKR), are likely to
have a comparative advantage over other types of third-party equity
investors in monitoring managers in highly levered firms, thus
lowering the benefits from using tighter debt terms to motivate
managers. Furthermore, buyout specialists are likely to be repeat
players in the LBO debt market; with their reputations as ‘good’
borrowers at stake, lenders are likely to lend to them at easier terms.
Thus, we hypothesize that LBOs controlled by buyout specialists are
likely to be financed with less short-term and/or senior debt because
the monitoring benefits from debt are less for these LBOs.
We examine the relationship between the characteristics of debt
and equity financing for a sample of 64 LBOs completed from 1984 to
1989. We find that when buyout specialists control the majority of the
post-LBO equity, the LBO transaction is likely to be financed with less
short-term and/or senior debt and subsequently less likely to default.
We also find that in these transactions, buyout specialists have greater
board representation on smaller boards, suggesting that they actively
monitor managers. We also find that for these transactions, using
more senior debt does not significantly increase the LBO firm's
performance. In contrast, in all other transactions, using more senior
debt does significantly increase the firm's performance. These findings
suggest that active monitoring by a buyout specialist substitutes for
tighter debt terms in monitoring and motivating managers.
This study makes three contributions. First, this paper adds to
previous research on the details of the structure of LBO debt and
equity by examining their joint role in improving firm performance.
The results here augment the findings in Denis (1994), a clinical paper
that examines the changes in organizational form for two highly
leveraged transactions. Denis focuses on changes in the organizational
form – third-party investors, managerial stock ownership,
compensation, and board composition – as they relate to increases in
operating efficiencies. Denis finds that buyout specialists in the
Safeway LBO significantly altered the organizational form, while
managers, without the help of buyout specialists in the leveraged
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recapitalization of Kroger, did not. Subsequently, firm value increased
more for Safeway than for Kroger. We use a larger sample to include
the role that debt structure plays as an alternative device to improve
the performance of an LBO firm.
This paper also extends the results of Kaplan and Stein (1993),
who examine the changes in the structure of debt financing in
management buyouts during the time period of 1980 to 1989. They
argue that the buyout market in the late 1980s “overheated,” a
showing that deals were financed using more publicly held
subordinated debt, had smaller increases in post-LBO operating
performance relative to buyout price, and were more likely to default.
Our study adds to their results by examining the role that equity
investors play in structuring the debt financing of LBOs. In our sample,
we find in the late 1980s more transactions where either management
or outside equity investors other than buyout specialists had a
controlling interest in the LBO. These transactions are also more likely
to default. Furthermore, as the amount of subordinate and/or longterm debt used to finance these deals increased, the increase in postLBO performance declined. Thus, our results suggest one source of the
“overheating” was a change in the type of equity investor participating
in the LBO market.
Second, this paper contributes to research on the determinants
of debt structure. Previous researchers have investigated how the
maturity and seniority of the debt varies with the extent of growth
options in the firm's investment opportunity set, degree of industry
regulation, firm size, firm quality, credit risk, and taxes (see Barclay
and Smith, 1995a,b, and the references therein). This paper
demonstrates that the structure of equity ownership or the identity of
the borrowers also determines the structure of debt. Of course, the
structure of equity ownership is endogenously determined with other
firm characteristics examined in previous studies. Yet, a lender is likely
to evaluate the impact that the motivations of the managers and/or
equity investors have on the firm's ability to re-pay the loan, which in
turn drives the choice of loan terms. This is likely to be particularly
true in the case of LBOs where both relatively large amounts are
borrowed and equity ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few
investors.
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Third, this paper examines another way in which active outside
equity investors increase shareholder value. Some researchers have
found that outside equity investors, i.e., blockholders, play an active
role in the market for corporate control (see Mikkelson and Ruback,
1985; Holderness and Sheehan, 1985; Brickley et al., 1988; Gilson,
1990; Shivdasani, 1993; Peck, 1996; Denis and Serrano, 1996).
Others have found that public pension funds pressure management
into changing corporate governance structures or restructuring assets
(see Romano, 1993; Murphy and Van Nuys, 1994; Wahal, 1996;
Karpoff et al., 1996; Gillan and Starks, 1998; Del Guercio and
Hawkins, 1999). Our results suggest that still another way that active
equity investors can increase value is by restructuring the debt to
minimize the expected bankruptcy and agency costs associated with
debt.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data
and the sample. Section 3 documents the relation between the debt
and equity structure used to finance LBO transactions in our sample.
Section 4 investigates whether buyout specialists are better at market
timing, which allows them to participate in better structured deals.
Section 5 reports the results of tests of other explanations for why we
find that transactions in which buyout specialists have a controlling
interest are likely to be financed with less short-term and/or senior
debt. Section 6 provides evidence on the costs and benefits of using
debt with tighter terms. Section 7 examines how buyout specialists
monitor and motivate managers in the post-LBO firm. Section 8
discusses potential selection biases with our sample. Section 9 states
our conclusions.

2. Sample and data
2.1. Sample
We construct a sample of 763 leveraged buyouts completed
during 1984 to 1989 using three sources. First, we use the Mergers
and Acquisitions magazine's annual top 100 acquisitions from 1984 to
1989 and the Investment Dealers Digest mergers and acquisitions
database available from Lexis/Nexis to identify LBOs completed from
1984 through 1989. Second, we augment this sample using a keyword
search on the full text of the Wall Street Journal from 1989 through
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1993. Leveraged buyouts are often referenced in the Wall Street
Journal after the completion of the transaction as well as when the
transaction occurs.
We require that certain data be publicly disclosed after the firm
has gone private. We define public disclosures as any 10-K filing,
proxy statement, or annual report available to provide data for our
analysis. We search both for the existence of all three documents and
the disclosure of a particular data item in any of the available
documents when collecting our data.
First, we require that public information is available on the
structure of the debt financing used to complete the LBO transaction
including a principal repayment schedule. This reduces the sample
from 763 to 125 firms. This sample size is comparable to that of other
studies. From a sample of management buyout offers (MBO)
transactions (defined on page 317 as `at least one member of the
incumbent management team obtains an equity interest in the new
private firma) that exceed $100 million, Kaplan and Stein (1993)
report in Table III, column (7), page 326, 71 firms that disclose data
on debt structure including a principal repayment schedule over our
sample period. Our sample of 125 is 76% larger than that of Kaplan
and Stein (1993), most likely because we do not restrict our sample to
MBOs or to large transactions.
Second, we require that the firms in our sample have sufficient
stock price data on Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP)/NASDAQ tapes to calculate buyout premiums. This reduces our
sample to 92 firms. Firms that did not have sufficient stock price data
to calculate a buyout premium typically arose from the purchase of
part of a larger company. For example, Ethan Allen was once part of a
publicly traded entity called Interco, a company composed of many
businesses including Converse Inc., The Florsheim Shoe Co., and
Broyhill Furniture Industries Inc., among others. In 1989, Ethan Allen
was purchased by a group of the firm's senior managers using
primarily debt financing. As a result, Ethan Allen was identified as an
LBO, but our measure of a buyout premium cannot be calculated since
Ethan Allen had no publicly traded stock before the LBO.
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Third, we require that firms disclose compensation and
ownership data for the first full post-buyout fiscal year. This
requirement reduces our sample from 92 to 76 firms. Many LBOs are
structured so that the firm becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of a
privately held holding company so that they are not required to
disclose compensation and ownership data. For example, Mary Kay
Cosmetics Inc. went private in 1985 and argued in their subsequent
10-K filings that they were not required to disclose compensation and
ownership data `pursant to General Instruction (J) (2) ( c ) of Form
10-K.a This finding is consistent with prior researchers' arguments that
one of the reasons companies go private is to avoid public disclosure
(see DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984).
Finally, we require that data is available on Compustat the year
after the deal is completed so that we can measure firm performance
for the first full post-buyout fiscal year. Twelve firms were eliminated
for failing to meet this requirement. GAF is an example of an LBO that
meets the other data requirements but does not have publicly
available data on post-LBO performance. In March 1989, GAF
Corporation was acquired by a management group led by Samuel J.
Heyman, GAF's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. The last proxy
statement for the company was filed on January 1, 1989 disclosing the
ownership and compensation structure of the company before the LBO
transaction. After the transaction, one 10-K was filed on April 20,
1990, disclosing information regarding the debt management,
ownership, and compensation structure of the firm just after the LBO
was completed and the financial performance for the firm for fiscal
year 1989, the year prior to the LBO. The company did not file any
subsequent financial statements that would provide data on post-LBO
firm performance for our empirical tests. This last data requirement
reduces our final sample to 64 firms.

2.2. Structure of the debt
Data used to measure the structure of the debt is obtained from
public disclosures that describe the terms of the transaction. These
disclosures provide a minimum principal repayment schedule over the
subsequent five-year period for the total debt outstanding (both
publicly issued debt and private debt such as bank loans) at the time
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the transaction is completed. The longest maturity of the total
outstanding debt is also disclosed. A variable we call average maturity
is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then
dividing by the total amount of debt outstanding. For the first five
years the principal repayments used are those disclosed in the
financial statements. For years six through the year of the longest
maturity of the debt, we evenly amortize the remaining debt
outstanding. We also provide alternative measures of maturity as
percentage of debt due in more than one, two, three, four, and five
years using the measures devised by Barclay and Smith (1995a). All of
our measures of maturity are statistically significantly positively
correlated with each other. These maturity variables measure the
minimum debt obligations due to the lender and thus what we call the
relative tightness of the debt terms. These maturity measures exclude
call features of the debt that effectively shorten the maturity of the
debt. Debt calls, however, are at the discretion of the borrower. We do
not expect that borrowers would exercise the call option and pay back
the debt sooner during periods of financial distress. Excluding the
effect of call options creates thus a more conservative measure of the
tightness of debt terms for the purposes of our tests.
We also calculate a standard duration measure by discounting
the principal repayments. We calculate four duration measures using a
discount rate of 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%. We re-run our tests using
these measures of duration. The results continue to hold when we use
an interest rate of 5% but not when we use higher interest rates. At
higher interest rates, duration is not significantly related to our
explanatory variables. However, using higher interest rates reduces
the cross-sectional dispersion in our duration measure; the standard
deviation as a percentage of the mean decreases by more than 50%
when using higher interest rates. Reducing the dispersion in the
independent variable reduces the power of the tests.
Public disclosures also provide information about the amount of
different types of debt that we use to create the following five classes
of debt based on their seniority: (1) senior bank debt (highest
seniority), which includes term loan facilities, revolving loan facilities,
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) facilities, tender offer facilities,
partnership loans, and other bank debt excluding bridge financing; (2)
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bridge financing (of equal seniority to senior bank debt); (3) senior
secured notes (second highest seniority), which includes senior
extendable notes and senior increasing rate notes; (4) senior notes
(third highest seniority), which includes unsecured sinking fund
debentures; (5) senior subordinated note (fourth highest seniority);
(6) subordinated notes (lowest seniority); (7) industrial revenue bonds
(unclassified seniority), which includes equipment financing, mortgage
notes, capitalized lease obligations, and real estate backed loans; and
(8) other (unclassified seniority), which is the amount of debt
classified as ‘other’ on the financial statements, and includes
commercial paper. We do not classify the seniority of industrial
revenue bonds because default is likely to lead to the creditor seizing
the asset backing the financing rather than forcing the firm into
bankruptcy. The seniority of ‘other’ is not classified because we lack
information other than for commercial paper, a negligible percentage
of this category. Using the above classifications, we develop an
average seniority measure equal to [(bridge financing + bank debt) *5
+ senior secured debt*4 + senior debt*3 + senior subordinated
debt*2 + subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other industrial revenue bonds]. This measure will be 5 when all senior bank
debt is used to finance the LBO and 1 when all subordinated debt, i.e.,
‘junk’ bonds, is used. We also provide the percentage of the type of
debt in each seniority class as alternative measures of seniority.
Ideally, we would like to have the individual repayment schedule
for each issuance of debt so that we could calculate separately the
average maturity for debt that was issued at the time the LBO was
completed and any previously issued debt. An individual repayment
schedule would allow us to measure the average maturity for different
seniority classes of debt. All our measures of maturity are statistically
significantly negatively correlated with all our measures of seniority.
This finding is consistent with previous studies that have found that
privately held senior bank debt tends to be short-term, while publicly
held subordinate debt tends to be long-term (see Gilson and Warner,
1996). We use our variables of average maturity and average seniority
in our tests. We also use as alternative measures of debt structure the
percentage of debt that tends to be short-term and senior (bridge
financing and senior secured notes) and the percentage of debt that
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tends to be long-term and subordinate (senior subordinated debt and
subordinated debt).

2.3. Equity financing
Data on equity financing is also obtained from the disclosure
that describes the terms of the transaction. Equity financing is
expressed as a percentage of newly issued common stock of the
buyout firm provided by different types of investors. While some
equity financing is provided by issuing other types of stock, common is
both used in every LBO transaction and represents the largest amount
of the equity financing. It also has the most voting power.

2.4. Financial distress
Data from the Wall Street Journal is used to determine financial
distress within two, four, and six years after the buyout is completed.
We also search the bankruptcy reports available in Lexis/Nexis for
instances where the LBOs in the sample are either restructured or
enter bankruptcy. Our definition of financial distress is either a
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors
accept less than full compensation for their original debt position by
either reductions in stated interest or principal, extensions of debt
maturity, or grants of equity interests to creditors. Our definition of
financial distress is the same as both Denis and Denis (1995) and
Gilson (1989). Table 1 reports the distribution of LBOs over the sample
period, cross-tabulated with the number of LBOs with available
financial data and financial distress within two, four, and six years. The
number of LBOs shown is comparable to that in other studies (see
Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990; and Kaplan and Stein, 1993). While there
is no apparent relationship between data availability and financial
distress over the sample period, we do find that LBOs completed in
1986 and 1988 are more likely to undergo financial distress. This
finding is consistent with Kaplan and Stein (1993), who find that
‘overheating’ in the buyout market in the late 1980s led to LBOs that
were more likely to experience financial distress. In the remaining
tests, we use the incidence of financial distress within six years of the
LBO as our measure of default.
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2.5. Board composition and managerial compensation
Data on board composition and managerial compensation is
obtained from public disclosures that are filed within one year after the
LBO is completed. We use data reflecting the earliest disclosed change
in post-buyout board composition and the data reflecting
compensation structure for the first full fiscal year after the buyout is
completed. Compensation structure includes the CEO's common stock
ownership, common stock options granted, total cash compensation,
salary and bonus (when disclosed), and the existence of stock
appreciation rights or options granted for securities other than
common stock. We also collect data on the existence of a bonus plan.
However, since only five firms failed to report a bonus plan, we
exclude this data item from subsequent tests, but not the five firms.

2.6. Other firm characteristics
Data to measure goodwill and total assets on completion of the
LBO are collected using statements filed as part of public disclosure of
the LBO. Compustat is used to collect data on operating income before
depreciation and amortization, EBITDA (item #13), total assets (item
#6), total sales (item #12), total shareholder's equity (item #216),
retained earnings (item #36), total current liabilities (item #5), and
debt in current liabilities (item #34) for the first full post-buyout fiscal
year. We also collect data on these items for the next four post-LBO
fiscal years when it is available. Data on EBITDA, total assets, and
total sales is also collected for the full fiscal year prior to the LBO. We
collect data on EBITDA and total sales for the prior ten pre-buyout
years when it is available. Following Kaplan and Stein (1993) we use
this data to calculate the standard deviation of the growth rate in
operating margins (EBITDA/sales) as a measure of risk. CRSP monthly
return data is used to construct the average industry raw return using
two-digit SIC codes for each firm in the sample. The return measure is
the average holding period return of all firms in the industry for two,
four, and six years after the buyout.
We use data from the Wall Street Journal and the CRSP tapes to
calculate a buyout premium. The buyout premium is calculated using
the final buyout offer price and the stock price 30 days before the
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announcement date. The announcement date is defined as the first
report of any buyout activity, including rumors. In the case of offers
that are not all cash, the buyout price per share is calculated by
dividing the total buyout price by the number of shares outstanding.
We use the Wall Street Journal to determine whether a hostile bid was
made for the firm. Data on asset sales during the first year of the LBO
are also collected from the Wall Street Journal.

3. The relation between the structure of debt and
equity financing in LBOs
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the type of investors
providing equity financing. Buyout specialists such as KKR, Citicorp
Venture Capital, Ltd., and Kelso Company are the majority of the
investors, providing, on average, 51.64% of the equity financing.
Management provides, on average, 20.03%, and miscellaneous
corporations such as Campeau Corp., Lowes Corp., and Hallmark
Cards provide, on average, 13.14%. The transactions financed by
miscellaneous corporations are best described as “takeovers.” For
example, Campeau's acquisition of Allied Stores was structured as a
leveraged buyout. The remainder of the equity financing is provided by
ESOPs, insurance companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit
corporations, individual investors, and individually organized limited
partnerships.
Table 2 also shows that buyout specialists have majority control
in 40 or 63% of the deals. We define majority control as owning 50%
or more of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one
investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage
of common stock; in two firms, buyout specialists are assigned
control; in one firm, management; and in three firms, other outside
equity investors. In the remainder of our tests we use dummy
variables to indicate when management, buyout specialists, or other
outside equity investors have control. We include ESOP controlled
LBOs in the management-controlled group because top management
owns stock in the ESOP and often acts as a trustee directing the voting
of the ESOP shares. We use a dummy variable for control because
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investors with majority ownership have enough votes to influence the
policies of the firm.
These three types of controlling investors – management,
buyout specialists, and other outside investors – are likely to have
different incentives to improve post-LBO firm value and avoid default.
On the one hand, when management owns almost all of the equity,
they have powerful incentives to work hard to increase equity value.
On the other hand, when management owns almost all of the equity,
conflicts between debtholders and shareholders are likely to be
relatively more severe for two reasons. First, managers have the
means to transfer wealth to themselves from debtholders via
managerial decisions about the allocation of the firm's resources.
Second, when managers own almost all of the equity, all of the gains
from such decisions will accrue to the managers and free-riding by
outside shareholders is minimized. For such firms, conflicts between
shareholders and debt holders can be minimized by using senior bank
and/or short-term debt (see Smith and Warner, 1979; Barclay and
Smith, 1995a, and the references therein).
Like management, buyout specialists also have incentives to
increase equity value. Most buyout specialist firms are structured as
limited liability partnerships. These partnerships raise buyout funds
from institutional investors but often the buyout specialists who
manage the fund are also principals and share directly in the increase
in LBO equity value (see The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 1986, p.1
and August 30, 1986, p.3). Unlike management, they have
disincentives to expropriate the wealth of debtholders. While managers
are likely to participate in only one LBO deal in their careers, buyout
specialists profit by doing repeated deals. Since they are likely to
return to debt markets, it is important for them to retain their
reputation as ‘good’ borrowers to insure their access to debt capital on
relatively favorable terms. In addition, since buyout specialists are
involved in many LBOs, they are likely to become skilled in monitoring
managers of LBOs. If the cost of monitoring management is less than
the costs of using tighter debt terms to motivate managers, buyout
specialists are likely to use less short-term and/or senior debt to
finance the LBO transaction.
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The majority of other types of outside investors are corporations
that have structured the acquisition of another company as an LBO.
The acquisition becomes a subsidiary and the LBO debt is issued in the
acquired firm's name. The managers of the parent company are likely
to have less incentive than either management or buyout specialists to
increase the equity value of the LBO for two reasons. First, the
managers of these corporations often have no direct equity investment
in these companies; they have used corporate resources to purchase
the LBO subsidiary. Second, the LBO performance will increase the
wealth of the managers of the parent company only indirectly through
the effects of incentive compensation such as accounting-based
bonuses, stock options, stock value, etc. To the extent that the LBO
constitutes only a portion of the parent company's total portfolio of
projects, the performance of the target LBO will have less impact on
the compensation of the parent's top management. Furthermore, the
parent's executives may be relatively inexperienced in monitoring
management in the highly levered subsidiary. These types of outside
investors are likely to find using debt with tighter terms a relatively
low-cost way of motivating managers. In turn, lenders, cognizant of
these incentive problems with LBO subsidiaries, are likely to prefer to
lend more short-term and/or senior debt, which will give them more
leverage over management.
The category of other types of outside investors includes
insurance companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations,
individuals, and individually organized limited partnerships. These
investors have less incentive to monitor LBO management. In the
majority of these cases, the purchase of LBO equity is a passive
investment. This is reflected in the fact that these investors in our
sample never purchase a controlling interest. Even in the two cases
where these investors were assigned control because they owned the
largest percentage of stock, they still did not own a majority. In these
companies, stock ownership is less concentrated, reducing the
incentives of any one investor to increase equity value. These
investors are likely to rely on tighter debt terms as a way to motivate
management. At the same time, lenders prefer to lend debt with
tighter terms.
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Table 3 shows how debt characteristics vary with the type of
controlling equity investor. As we predicted, buyout specialistcontrolled LBOs tend to use less short-term and/or senior debt to
finance the LBO than those controlled by either management or other
outside investors. Both our measure of average maturity and the
percentage of debt due in more than five years are, on average,
greater for buyout specialist-controlled LBOs. Table 3 also shows that
management-controlled LBOs, on average, use more senior debt and
use less senior subordinated debt than buyout specialist-controlled
LBOs. LBOs controlled by other outside investors, on average, use less
subordinated debt. Table 3 also shows that buyout specialist-controlled
LBOs are less likely to default than either management-or other
outside investor-controlled LBOs. All these results are statistically
significant at conventional levels. This finding suggests that tighter
debt terms, in fact, increase the incidence of default in LBOs and so
can act as a tool to motivate management. In the following sections,
we test alternative explanations to these findings.

4. Are buyout specialists better at market timing?
Kaplan and Stein (1993) present evidence that ‘overheating’ in
the LBO market in the late 1980s led to poorly structured deals. One
explanation for our finding that buyout specialists participate in deals
that are less likely to default is that they participated in more deals
early on in our sample period. Table 4 shows the frequency of deals
completed for each year in our sample by different types of controlling
investors, cross-tabulated with the type of debt used and the incidence
of default. Consistent with Kaplan and Stein, we find that both the
number of deals and default rates increased in the late 1980s. Yet,
Table 4 shows that the buyout specialists in our sample participated in
this ‘overheated’ market as well as other investors. We find, in our
sample, both that buyout specialists increased the number of deals
that they completed in the late 1980s and more of these were likely to
default. The default rate for buyout specialist-controlled LBOs is less
for each year than for either management-or other outside equity
investor-controlled LBOs, except for 1985, when only five deals by all
types of investors were completed, and 1989, when only one deal
defaulted.
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Consistent with Kaplan and Stein we also find that, on average,
the amount of subordinate debt financing increased in the late 1980s.
In our sample, senior subordinated notes and subordinated debt as a
percentage of total debt grew from an average value of 11% (median
value of 3%) in 1984 to an average value of 32% (median value of
36%) in 1989. As Table 4 shows, again except for 1985, we find that
buyout specialist-controlled deals consistently used, on average, less
senior debt and/or debt of longer maturity than deals controlled by
either management or other outside investors.
Interestingly, the findings in Table 4 suggest that one potential
source of the ‘overheating’ documented by Kaplan and Stein is the
increase in deals completed by management and, particularly, other
outside investors in the late 1980s. We find that deals completed by
these investors have a higher incidence of default. Kaplan and Stein
also find that, in the late 1980s, an increase in the use of subordinate
publicly held ‘junk’ bonds to finance deals that produced smaller
increases in post-LBO performance. We also find evidence (presented
in Section 6) that when deals were financed with less short-term
and/or senior debt and more with long-term and/or subordinate debt,
there is less of an increase in post-LBO performance. These findings
hold only for management-or other outside investor-controlled deals.
Again, this suggests that one source of ‘overheating’ in the LBO
market was the change in the type of investors controlling the deals
and a choice of debt structure that failed to adequately monitor
management.

5. Are buyout specialists better at picking deals
that ex ante can be financed with less short term
and/or senior debt?
5.1. Growth options and the duration of assets
The choice of debt structure may also be related to the extent of
growth options in the firm's investment opportunity set (see Barclay
and Smith, 1995a). Buyout specialists may participate in the deals in
which growth options drive the choice of maturity structure rather than
any monitoring by buyout specialists. Following Barclay and Smith we
use the ratio of the market value of the firm's assets to their book
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value as a proxy for growth options. We estimate the market value of
the firm's assets as the book value of assets when they are written up
to reflect the buyout price on completion of the transaction. To create
the ratio, we use the book value of assets for the year before the
transaction. Table 5 shows there is no difference in our measure of
growth options between firms in which buyout specialists have control
and other LBOs. The ratio of buyout price to book value of assets can
also reflect over or under pricing of the LBO rather than the extent of
growth options. If this ratio is a noisy measure of growth options it can
make it difficult to find statistically significant differences in growth
options between different types of investor-controlled LBOs. It is likely
that in our sample there is little dispersion in the extent of the firm's
growth options. LBO candidates are likely to have high levels of free
cash flow (see Jensen, 1986 and 1989; and Lehn and Poulsen, 1989)
and thus are more likely to be clustered towards the “assets in place”
end of the growth options continuum (see Myers, 1977). In our sample
the extent of the firm's growth options may explain little of the crosssectional variation in debt characteristics.
We also include EBITDA/(EBITDA + asset sales) as an
alternative measure of the duration of the assets. In LBOs, value can
be created by some combination of asset sales and improvements in
operating cash flows. When the gains from an LBO primarily come
from asset sales, debt financing is more likely to be short-term bank
loans because asset sales are usually arranged at the time of the
transaction. Thus, the proceeds from the asset sales can be used to
pay of debt early on. In contrast, when the gains primarily come from
improvements in operational efficiencies, then long-term debt is more
likely to be used to finance the LBO. It is possible that buyout
specialists are more likely to participate in deals where improvements
in operational efficiencies account for a larger proportion of post-LBO
value creation. Table 5 shows that there is no statistically significant
difference in (EBITDA/EBITDA + asset sales) between firms in which
buyout specialists have control and those controlled by other types of
investors.

Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 59, No. 1 (January 2001): pg. 101-147. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

17

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

5.2. Buyout transaction
It is possible that the structure of the debt is determined in
large part by the control contest that precedes the ultimate buyout
transaction. In an attempt to secure credible financing, bidders for the
firm may have used a particular type of debt because such funds were
readily available rather than because of the monitoring benefits from
various types of debt. On the one hand, Kaplan and Stein argue that in
the late 1980s deals were both overpriced and financed with more
subordinate, publicly held, ‘junk’ bonds because these sources of funds
were readily available. On the other hand, private short-term financing
may be easier to arrange during ‘heated’ buyout contests. It is also
possible that buyout specialists use less short-term and/or senior debt
because of characteristics of the buyout contest in which they engage.
We use four measures to capture the characteristics of the
buyout transactions. First, we collect data on the number of LBOs with
hostile bidders. Second, we include the frequency of deals done after
1985 to proxy for the ‘overheating’ phenomenon documented by
Kaplan and Stein. Third, we use as measures of overpayment the
buyout premium paid and the amount of goodwill scaled by total
assets. Goodwill is measured by the difference between the buyout
price and the book value of the assets at the time the transaction is
completed.
We recognize, however, that both measures are noisy proxies
for overpayment. Using the buyout premium assumes that firms that
pay higher premiums are more likely to overpay and yet some buyouts
justify a higher buyout premium. Similarly, lower premiums can also
reflect overpayment when this premium is high relative to post-LBO
firm value. Likewise, higher goodwill can be due to overpayment but
also due to older assets or less tangible assets (for example, for a
service firm) with lower book values or to a buyout with higher postbuyout value.
Table 5 shows that a smaller number of management-controlled
LBOs had a hostile bidder during the buyout contest than other types
of LBOs. It is likely that in management-controlled LBOs, management
owns enough pre-buyout equity to successfully deter a potential
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competitive bidder (see Peck, 1996). Table 5 also shows that deals
controlled by buyout specialists have, on average, statistically
significantly higher buyout premiums than deals controlled by
management. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that
buyout specialists both overpaid for LBOs and used more readily
available ‘junk’ bond debt. Alternatively, buyout specialists may have
participated in deals that generated greater post-LBO value. In the
following section, we provide evidence that supports this alternative
explanation.

5.3. Firm performance
It is likely that LBOs that have higher expected cash flows are
easier to finance with long-term and/or publicly held subordinated
debt. Thus, one explanation for our findings is that buyout specialists
participate in ‘better’ deals. Following Kaplan (1989) and Denis (1994),
we use three measures for performance – operating cash flows scaled
by total assets (EBITDA/total assets), sales (EBITDA/total sales), and
asset sales (asset sales/total assets). We report the levels of these
measures as well as the percentage change from before to after the
LBO. Because the book value of assets are written up to reflect the
LBO purchase price, earlier researchers adjust the pre-LBO book value
of assets (usually by increasing pre-LBO total assets by the difference
in pre-LBO book value and the purchase price) “to make inter temporal
comparisons meaningful” (p. 226, Kaplan, 1989; Denis, 1994).
Similarly, we also adjust our measure of pre-LBO total assets. As a
measure of pre-LBO total assets, we use total assets measured at the
end of the first post-LBO fiscal year, which reflects the price paid for
the LBO minus any asset sales that occurred during the first year. Of
course, if the firm sold off assets that contributed to EBITDA in the
pre-LBO year, this would erroneously inflate our measure of pre-LBO
performance. Thus, we add back asset sales to our measure of total
assets to measure performance in the pre-LBO year.
Table 5 shows that there is no difference among the three type
of investor-controlled LBOs in operating cash flows, scaled by either
total assets or sales, in the fiscal year before the LBO. There is
substantial evidence, however, that after the LBO, operating cash
flows increase significantly (see Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990). It is
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likely that lenders use pro-forma financial statements that project an
increase in operating cash flows when they are negotiating debt terms.
The findings in Table 5 suggest that buyout specialist-controlled LBOs
perform better than the other types. Buyout specialist-controlled LBOs,
on average, have higher operating cash flows scaled by total assets in
their first post-LBO year than outside-investor controlled LBOs. We
also find that this better performance is sustained. While not reported
in the tables, we also find that (EBITDA/total assets) are statistically
significantly higher for years two, four, and five. Compared to
management LBOs, buyout specialist LBOs, on average, have a larger
percentage increase in operating cash flows scaled by total sales. This
result is statistically significant at the 10% level. While not reported in
the table, we also find that buyout specialist LBOs, on average, have
statistically significant higher operating cash flows scaled by total
assets for post-LBO years three and four. Buyout specialist controlled
deals also have higher asset sales and this result is statistically
significant at the 10% level, as Table 5 shows.
These higher levels of post-LBO operating performance in firms
controlled by buyout specialists could be because they pick deals that
are better ex ante or they more effectively monitor management in the
post-LBO firm. Similarly, buyout specialists may pick deals that have
more assets that can be profitably sold off or they may play a more
active role instigating the sell-off of assets. In either case, lenders are
likely to extend easier terms to buyout specialists.

5.4. Firm size and leverage
Larger firms are likely to have better access to public debt
markets and are thus less likely to rely on private debt, which tends to
be both short-term and senior. Buyout specialists may be more likely
to participate in larger deals; thus, we also investigate whether buyout
specialist-controlled LBOs are larger than the others. We use both total
sales and the total book value of assets as a proxy for firm size. Table
5 shows that buyout specialist-controlled LBOs are not statistically
significantly larger than other LBOs.
It is also likely that firms that borrow more use more long-term
debt. If buyout specialists borrow more than other investors, then it
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possible that these deals are financed using less short-term and/or
senior debt. We measure leverage as total debt used to finance the
deal divided by book value of assets, which reflects the buyout price.
Table 5 shows that buyout specialist-controlled LBOs do not differ
significantly from others in the amount of leverage used.

5.5. Risk
Credit risk will increase when expected future cash flows are
more variable or riskier. As credit risk increases, lenders want to be
re-paid sooner and use more restrictive debt terms (see Diamond,
1993). Thus, buyout specialists may participate in LBOs with less risky
cash flows which may be easier to finance with less short-term and/ or
senior debt. Table 5 shows that there is no statistically significant
difference in our measure of risk between buyout specialist-controlled
LBOs and other types of LBOs.

5.6. Equity financing
Buyout specialists may provide more equity financing that
prevents an LBO from defaulting. If they have a reputation for doing
so, lenders may be willing to extend easier terms to them. We use
total capital contributed by equity holders (defined as total
shareholders' equity minus retained earnings) divided by total assets
as a measure of equity financing. Table 5 shows that buyout specialistcontrolled LBOs, on average, do not contribute more capital than
management-controlled LBOs. While not reported in the table, we also
do not find that buyout specialist firms have significantly higher levels
of contributed capital in post-LBO years two through five. Buyout
specialist-controlled LBOs have, on average, a higher dollar amount of
contributed capital in the first post-LBO year than other outside
investors. This result is statistically significant at the 5% level. It is
likely that as experts in the buyout market, buyout specialists have
easier access to capital than other types of outside equity investors. In
addition, since buyouts are their primary business, buyout specialists
are likely to commit more capital to the LBO than other outside
investors. Yet, when other outside investors invest a lower amount in
the LBO, they have less incentive to monitor management.
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5.7. Cross-sectional regressions explaining debt
structure
Table 6 shows the results of cross-sectional regressions
explaining the choice of debt structure. Since we do not have
observations for all the firms in our sample for the amount of equity
capital contributed and risk, we exclude these observations from our
regressions. When we include these variables in our regressions our
results are qualitatively the same, but the statistical significance of the
regression is reduced. The results show that buyout specialistcontrolled LBOs are significantly more likely to use debt with longer
maturity and less likely to use senior debt after controlling for other
variables. We hypothesize that active monitoring by buyout specialists
decreases the monitoring benefits of short-term and/or senior debt. In
the next two sections, we provide evidence to support this hypothesis.

6. Is using short term and/or senior debt to
5nance LBOs more costly?
6.1. The likelihood of default
Using less debt that is short-term and/or senior is beneficial
when it decreases the likelihood of default and associated bankruptcy
costs. We test in our LBO sample whether deals financed with such
debt, in fact, are more likely to default.
We estimate parameters of a logitistic regression, which
includes various measures for the degree to which the debt is senior or
short-term. We also control for other variables that are likely to
increase the likelihood of default. As post-LBO operating cash flows
and proceeds for asset sales increase, the firm is likely to have more
cash to cover debt obligations. If the equity investors have overpaid
for the firm, they are more likely to have either insufficient post-LBO
cash flows to cover debt obligations or to have structured the deal
poorly. Palepu and Wruck (1992) also find that defensive leveraged
transactions are more likely to be poorly structured. Thus, as in
Section 5, we use as proxies of overpayment and defensive
transactions the buyout premium, the presence of a hostile bidder,
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goodwill/ total assets, and a dummy variable for whether the deal was
completed after 1985.
Denis and Denis (1995) show that ex post macroeconomic
variables contributed to the financial distress for leverage
recapitalizations. It is possible that LBOs default because either the
market performed poorly or the industry they are in performed poorly.
Thus, we include a measure of post-LBO industry performance. The
return measure is the average holding period return of all firms in the
industry for two, four, and six years after the completion of the
buyout. Monthly returns are used to calculate the holding period
return. Table 5 shows that industry performance is not statistically
significantly higher for buyout specialist-controlled LBOs than for other
LBOs. Since we are measuring the incidence of default over six years,
we use in our regression the average holding period return for six
years after the completion of the buyout.
We also examine expected debt coverage as a direct method to
determine whether firms are able to meet their future debt obligations.
We measure expected debt coverage as EBITDA for the first post-LBO
year divided by the amount of debt due in one, two, three, four, and
five years. Table 5 shows that expected debt coverage is statistically
significantly higher for buyout specialist-controlled firms than other
outside investor-controlled firms for the first post-LBO year. The
combination of using debt with longer maturity, which lowers the per
period debt obligation, and higher post-LBO cash flows increases the
debt coverage for buyout specialist-controlled firms.
Since firms that are larger and have less leverage are less likely
to default, we also include size (book value of total assets) and
leverage (total debt/total assets) in our regression. We also include a
dummy variable for whether the LBO is controlled by a buyout
specialist. This allows us to test our earlier result reported in Table 3
that control by buyout specialists decreases the likelihood of default
even after controlling for other variables that could cause default.
Table 7 reports the results of logit regressions for the likelihood
of default. These regressions show that as more short-term and/or
senior debt is used the likelihood of default increases. Table 7 also
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shows that LBOs controlled by buyout specialists are less likely to
default after controlling for other variables. While not reported in the
tables when we re-run the regressions using the percentage of bridge
financing, senior secured notes, senior subordinated debt and
subordinated debt, as alternative measures of seniority and maturity,
we get qualitatively same results.
Since we do not make observations for all the firms in our
sample for the amount of equity capital contributed and risk, we
exclude these observations from our regressions. When we include
these variables in our regressions, our results are qualitatively the
same, but the statistical significance of the regression is reduced.
We do not collect data on bankruptcy costs associated with
default in our sample because this data is very costly to obtain. Other
researchers, however, have documented the costs of bankruptcy.
Weiss (1990) estimates that direct bankruptcy costs are on average
3.1% of total book value of debt plus the market value of equity.
Anrade and Kaplan (1998) estimate that the costs of financial distress
for a sample of highly levered transactions between 10% to 23% of
firm value. We assume that these estimates of the costs of financial
distress for the firms in our sample would be comparable.
More importantly, financial distress in LBOs is likely to reduce
the return on equity holders' investment. Anrade and Kaplan estimate
post-buyout equity investors earn an average total nominal return of
17% for a sample of highly leveraged transactions that become
financially distressed. There are likely to be similar losses from
financial distress for investors in our sample. Thus, equity investors
have incentives to arrange the terms of the debt to avoid these costs
when they can.

6.2. The monitoring benefits of short-term and/or
senior debt
Wruck (1990) and Jensen (1989) argue that default and
bankruptcy may have benefits that offset its costs. In an extension of
that fundamental point, while more short-term and/or more senior
debt increases the incidence of default, it is also likely to create
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powerful incentives for managers to improve operating performance.
Furthermore, Kaplan (1994) and Andrade and Kaplan provide evidence
that when the threat of default fails to motivate management, default
serves as a mechanism to re-organize the firm more profitably. Buyout
specialists may find that actively monitoring managers, themselves, is
less costly than using debt as a disciplining device. When buyout
specialists control the LBO and actively monitor managers, firm
performance will improve with or without using debt with tighter
terms. In other LBOs, the use of tighter debt terms is likely to have a
greater impact on managerial incentives and firm performance.
Table 8 reports the results of a regression to explain post-LBO
changes in firm performance. We measure post-LBO changes as the
percentage change in (EBITDA/total sales) from the year before the
LBO to the first post-LBO year. As explanatory variables, we use the
firm's debt structure and equity structure. We use a dummy variable
for firms where buyout specialists have control and multiply the debt
structure variables by this dummy since we expect that the use of debt
in these firms to improve performance is likely to be different than in
other firms. We also include the firm's pre-LBO operating cash flows
scaled by sales, since firms that have a higher percentage change are
likely to have a lower base to begin with. We also include a dummy
variable for LBOs that occur after 1985 to control for ‘overheating’ in
the LBO market.
Table 9 reports the results of regressions similar to those of
Table 8. The exception is that we measure post-LBO changes as the
relative (rank value) percentage change in (EBITDA/total sales) from
the year before the LBO to the first post-LBO year. We use rank values
because it reduces the influence of outliers in our regression. This is
particularly a problem when (EBITDA/total sales) before the LBO is
small, since a change in (EBITDA/total sales) becomes an even larger
percentage change. For example, a firm in our sample (controlled by a
buyout specialist) went from (EBITDA/total sales) of 0.04417 to
0.11502, which represented a 160.387% change. This was over ten
times the average value of 15.951% for the entire sample. As the
results in Tables 8 and 9 show, when we do not use rank values the
results are qualitatively the same but the statistical significance of the
regression is lowered.
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We find that as non buyout specialist-controlled LBOs use more
senior debt, the change in their operating performance is greater. We
find the opposite relation for buyout specialist LBOs; in an equivalent
test estimating a regression using only a sample of buyout specialistcontrolled LBOs, the coefficient on the amount of senior debt used is
statistically insignificantly different from zero. These finding suggest
that more restrictive debt terms increase managerial incentives and
firm performance only when the control of buyout specialists is absent.
Rather than increases in operating efficiency, lenders are more
likely to be interested in the ultimate level of cash flows available to
meet debt obligations relative to the total capital invested in the LBO,
which, on average, they provide 87.62% (median value of 85.58%).
Thus, the terms of the debt are likely to have a greater impact on the
level of post-LBO performance rather than the change. As an
alternative measure of post-LBO performance, we use post-LBO
operating cash flows scaled by total capital measured at the end of the
first post-LBO fiscal year, calculated as total assets minus non debt
current liabilities. Table 10 reports the results of this alternative
measure of post-LBO performance. The results are qualitatively similar
to those reported in Tables 8 and 9, but more statistically significant.
We also re-run the regressions in Tables 8}10 using the percentage of
bridge financing, senior secured notes, senior subordinated debt and
subordinated debt, as alternative measures of seniority and maturity
and get qualitatively same results.

7. How do buyout specialists monitor managers in
the post-LBO firm?
One way that outside equity investors can improve managerial
incentives is to provide greater incentive compensation. As part of
arranging the buyout, equity investors are also likely to play a role in
restructuring management's compensation package. Denis (1994)
provides evidence that improved incentive compensation and higher
managerial ownership arranged by the LBO specialist, such as KKR,
leads to greater post-LBO value creation. Thus, it is likely that buyout
specialists improve incentive compensation in the post-LBO firm. Table
11 reports differences in various measures of incentive compensation
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buyout specialist-controlled LBOs and other LBOs, using similar
measures as reported in Denis. The results in Table 11 suggest that,
other than the larger amount of stock held by management in
management-controlled LBOs, there are no statistically significant
differences in the structure of incentive compensation between firms
with the three types of controlling investors.
Outside investors can also monitor and motivate management
by their board membership. Board members have access to company
information to monitor the firm's on-going operations; to direct
operating strategy; and to evaluate management for an increase in
compensation or removal from the firm. Prior researchers have shown
that independent board members monitor managers (see Weisbach,
1988; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990;
Shivdasani, 1993; Brickley et al., 1994; Cotter et al., 1997). Table 12
shows how composition of the board varies with the type of controlling
investor. Buyout specialists take more representation on the boards
they control than do other types of outside investors. Buyout
specialist-controlled LBOs also have smaller boards. Yermack (1996)
provides evidence that smaller boards are more effective than larger
ones. Thus, buyout specialists are likely to more effectively monitor
managers by having more seats on the board and by having smaller
boards. These findings support our hypothesis that buyout specialists
are more active monitors than other outside controlling investors.

8. Potential sample selection bias
Because our initial sample of 125 LBOs is reduced to 64, our
results may be driven by a sample selection bias. While our sample
size is reduced because of insufficient data, we do have data on some
variables for firms that were excluded from our final sample because
we did not have data on all of the variables used in our tests. We use
these data to test whether there are significant differences in key
variables used in our tests between firms included and excluded in our
sample.
Table 13 shows that LBOs that are excluded from our sample do
not differ significantly in leverage, average seniority, incidence of
financial distress, the structure of equity financing, the frequency of
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various investor-controlled LBOs, or board composition. Not
surprisingly, Table 13 shows that firms excluded from our sample are
significantly smaller. Two data requirements for our tests tend to
exclude smaller firms. First, we require that firms be publicly traded
before the LBO so that we can calculate a buyout premium. Since, on
average, publicly traded firms are larger than privately held firms, our
sample will be biased towards larger firms. Second, we require that
firms disclose post-LBO performance. Firms are required to make
these disclosures only when they finance the LBO using publicly traded
securities. Privately financed LBOs are likely to be smaller. Table 13
also shows that there is no significant difference in post-LBO firm
performance between firms in and out of the sample. While pre-LBO
operating margins are significantly higher, post-LBO operating margins
and changes in post-LBO operating margins are not statistically
different for firms excluded from our sample from those that are
included. Finally, we find that the average maturity of the debt is
statistically significantly shorter for excluded firms, which suggests
that LBOs left out of our sample may use different types of debt
financing. More important to the interpretation of our results is
whether the relation between debt and equity financing and the
monitoring role that buyout specialists play is also different.
We have 20 excluded observations for which we have data on
equity ownership. We use these data to test whether LBOs controlled
by various types of investors excluded from our sample are financed
with a different debt structure than those included in our sample.
Table 14 reports differences in average maturity, average seniority,
and frequency of financial distress for buyout specialist-, management, and other investor-controlled LBOs that are included and excluded
from the final sample. The results in Table 14 show that there are no
statistically significant differences in the structure of the debt and the
frequency of financial distress for LBOs led by different types of
investors for deals included and excluded from the final sample.
We also have board composition data on the 20 excluded LBOs.
We use these data to examine the extent to which buyout specialists
versus other outside investors monitor the LBO via board
representation for firms out of the sample. For firms out of the sample,
buyout specialists have 26.12% (median value of 21.43%) of the

Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 59, No. 1 (January 2001): pg. 101-147. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

28

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

board seats on a board, with an average of 7.82 seats (median value
of 8.00 seats) for LBOs that they control. The percentage of board
seats is not statistically significantly different from that of buyout
specialist-controlled LBOs included in the final sample (reported in
Table 12) (p value for test of differences in means is 0.17; medians,
0.15), nor is board size (p value for test of difference in means is
0.77; medians, 0.78). For firms out of the sample, other outside
investors have 4.17% (median value of 4.17%) of the board seats on
a board of an average size of 5.66 seats (median value of 8.00 seats)
for LBOs that they control. Again, the percentage of board seats is not
statistically different from that of outside investor LBOs included in the
sample (reported in Table 12) (p value for test of differences in means
is 0.40; medians, 0.53), nor is board size (p value for test of
difference in means is 0.46; medians, 0.54). These findings suggest
that buyout specialists more actively monitor LBOs via board
membership compared to other outside investors for LBOs excluded
from the final sample as well as those that are included.
We are not able to test how the relationship between debt
structure and post-LBO performance varies across different types of
controlling investors for firms out of the sample. For these firms, we
do not have data on all three of these variables; this is the primary
reason why these firms are excluded from our final sample.
To the limited extent that we can empirically test for potential
sample biases, the results suggest that our findings are not driven by
a sample selection bias. Even though our sample is biased towards
larger publicly financed transactions, the relationship between debt
and equity structure and the buyout specialists' monitoring role in
LBOs they control is not likely to be significantly different from that of
smaller, privately financed transactions that are excluded from our
sample. Of course, because we are not able to empirically test whether
our results hold for privately financed LBOs for which we have no data,
we can not definitively conclude that our results would hold for these
transactions.
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9. Conclusion
Ever since Berle and Means (1932), the classic agency problem
is how investors control managers. Jensen's insight was that a high
level of debt is one way to insure managers have incentives to
maximize the value of the firm (see Jensen, 1986, 1989). Yet, as
Smith and Warner (1979) showed in their seminal article, there are
significant agency costs in relying on debt to motivate managers. The
missing piece has been the absence of active investors. Buyout
specialists are professional active investors. When they control the
LBO, they monitor management, providing a substitute for debt as a
disciplining device free of the agency and bankruptcy costs Smith and
Warner (1979) identify. We find that: (1) when buyout specialists
control the majority of the post-LBO equity, the LBO transaction is
likely to be financed with less short-term and/or senior debt and
subsequently less likely to default; (2) LBO performance only increases
with tighter debt terms for LBOs in which buyout specialists are not
involved; and (3) buyout specialists have greater board representation
on smaller boards, suggesting that they actively monitor managers.
These three findings support the general hypothesis that the presence
of an active equity investor, such as a buyout specialist, influences the
choice of debt structure as well as long-term firm performance.
Further research can focus on whether and under what circumstances
the presence of active investors of various types will influence the debt
structure of firms and their subsequent performance.
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Appendix
Table 1: Data availability and frequency of financial distress for a sample of
64 leveraged buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989

Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors.
a

Percentage of LBOs experiencing financial distress is calculated using the reduced
sample where financial data are available.
b

Table 2: Characteristics of equity financing for a sample of 64 leveraged
buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989

aExamples

of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts;
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company.
bExamples of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and
Hallmark Cards.
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Table 3: Characteristics of debt financing for different type of investorcontrolled LBOs for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed from 1984
to 1989 (medians reported in parentheses).a

Table 3 (continued)

Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 59, No. 1 (January 2001): pg. 101-147. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier.

35

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
**Statistically significant at the 5% level.
***Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Difference in means and medians between buyout specialist-controlled LBOs and
management-controlled LBOs and between buyout specialist-controlled LBOs and
other outside investor-controlled LBOs is tested. Difference in means tested using a
standard t-test. Difference in medians tested using a Wilcoxon sum rank test.
b Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group.
Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts;
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance
companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors,
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards.
c Total debt is the amount of debt outstanding at the time the transaction is
completed.
d Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors. The
relation between type of controlling investor and incidence of financial distress is
tested using a Chi-square test.
e Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt
outstanding is evenly amortized.
f Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing,
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures.
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds].
a
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Table 4: Default rates and debt characteristics by year of deal completion for
different type of investor-controlled LBOs for a sample of 64 leveraged
buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (medians reported in parenthesis).
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Table 4 (continued)

NA=not applicable
Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt
outstanding is evenly amortized.
b Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing,
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures.
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt *
2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds].
c Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors.
d Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group.
Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts;
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance
companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors,
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards.
a
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Table 5: Differences in financial and buyout characteristics for different type
of investor-controlled LBOs for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed
from 1984 to 1989 (medians reported in parentheses).a
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Table 5 (continued)
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Table 5 (continued)

*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
**Statistically significant at the 5% level.
***Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Difference in means and medians between buyout specialist-controlled LBOs and
management-controlled LBOs and between buyout specialist-controlled LBOs and
other outside investor-controlled LBOs is tested. Difference in means tested using a
standard t-test. Difference in medians tested using a Wilcoxon sum rank test. All data
collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted. Subscripted
time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, eg., t+1=first full fiscal post LBO
year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year.
b Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group.
Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts;
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance
companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors,
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards.
c The buyout premium is calculated using the final buyout price per share and the
stock price 30 days before the announcement date. The announcement date is defined
as the first report of any buyout activity, including rumors.
d Total assets are written up after the LBO is completed to reflect buyout price.
Because of this accounting change, total assets in the year before the buyout will be
a
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relatively low. For the year before the buyout, total assets are the total assets
reported the first year after the LBO is completed plus asset sales during the first year.
For similar adjustments to pre-buyout assets, see Kaplan (1989) and Denis (1996).
e Industry market adjusted monthly returns are calculated by taking the average
holding period return for all firms in two-digit SIC code industry minus the equal
weighted market return. The holding period is one year before the LBO completion.

Table 6: Regression coefficient estimates for debt maturity and seniority
characteristics for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed from 1984 to
1989 (p-values in parentheses).

Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt
outstanding is evenly amortized.
b Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing,
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures.
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other –industrial revenue bonds].
c Control by buyout specialists is a dummy variable equal to one when buyout
specialists control the LBO; zero otherwise. Control is defined as owning 50% or more
of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one investor owns 50% or
more of the voting common stock. In these cases, control is assigned to the investor
with the largest percentage of common stock. Examples of a buyout specialist in the
a
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sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso
Company.
d All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted.
Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, e.g., t+1=first full
fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year.
e The buyout premium is calculated using the final buyout price per share and the
stock price 30 days before the announcement date. The announcement date is defined
as the first report of any buyout activity, including rumors.
Table 7: Logistic coefficient estimates for the likelihood of financial distress
for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (p-values
in parentheses).a

Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors.
b Control by buyout specialists is a dummy variable equal to one when buyout
a
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specialists control the LBO; zero otherwise. Control is defined as owning 50% or more
of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one investor owns 50% or
more of the voting common stock. In these cases, control is assigned to the investor
with the largest percentage of common stock. Examples of a buyout specialist in the
sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso
Company.
c Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt
outstanding is evenly amortized.
d Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing,
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures.
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other –industrial revenue bonds].
e All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted.
Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, e.g., t+1=first full
fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year.
f Industry market adjusted monthly returns are calculated by taking the average
holding period return for all firms in two-digit SIC code industry minus the equal
weighted market return. The holding period is one year before the LBO completion.
g The buyout premium is calculated using the final buyout price per share and the
stock price 30 days before the announcement date. The announcement date is defined
as the first report of any buyout activity, including rumors.
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Table 8: Regression coefficient estimates for change in post-LBO
performance, measured as the percentage change in (EBITDA/total sale),
from t – 1 to t + 1, for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed from
1984 to 1989 (p-values in parentheses).a

All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted.
Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, e.g., t+1=first full
fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year.
b Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt
outstanding is evenly amortized.
c Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing,
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures.
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank
a
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debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds].
d Control by buyout specialists is a dummy variable equal to one when buyout
specialists control the LBO; zero otherwise. Control is defined as owning 50% or more
of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one investor owns 50% or
more of the voting common stock. In these cases, control is assigned to the investor
with the largest percentage of common stock. Examples of a buyout specialist in the
sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso
Company.
Table 9: Regression coefficient estimates for relative change in post-LBO
performance, measured as the rank value of the percentage change in
(EBITDA/total sales), from t – 1 to t + 1, for a sample of 64 leveraged
buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (p-values in parentheses).a

a

All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted.
Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, e.g., t+1=first full
fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year.
b Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For
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years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt
outstanding is evenly amortized.
c Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing,
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures.
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other-industrial revenue bonds].
d Control by buyout specialists is a dummy variable equal to one when buyout
specialists control the LBO; zero otherwise. Control is defined as owning 50% or more
of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one investor owns 50% or
more of the voting common stock. In these cases, control is assigned to the investor
with the largest percentage of common stock. Examples of a buyout specialist in the
sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso
Company.
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Table 10: Regression coefficient estimates for post-LBO performance,
measured as (EBITDA /total capital)t + 1, for a sample of 64 leveraged
buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (p-values in parentheses).a

All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion except where noted.
Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO completion date, e.g., t+1=first full
fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO year.
b Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt
outstanding is evenly amortized.
c Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing,
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures.
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank
a
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debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds].
d Control by buyout specialists is a dummy variable equal to one when buyout
specialists control the LBO; zero otherwise. Control is defined as owning 50% or more
of the voting common stock. There are six firms where no one investor owns 50% or
more of the voting common stock. In these cases, control is assigned to the investor
with the largest percentage of common stock. Examples of a buyout specialist in the
sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts; Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso
Company.

Table 11: Selected CEO compensation characteristics for different type of
investor-controlled LBOs for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts complete from
1984 to 1989 (medians in parentheses).a

*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
**Statistically significant at the 5% level.
***Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Difference in means and medians between buyout specialist-controlled firms and
management-controlled firms and between buyout specialist controlled firms and other
outside investor controlled firms is tested. Difference in means tested using a standard
t-test. Difference in medians tested using a Wilcoxon sum rank test. Statistical
difference in frequencies of number of firms tested using a chi-square test of
association. All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO completion.
b Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group.
a
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Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts;
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance
companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors,
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards.
c Stock ownership includes stock beneficially held as an equity partner in the LBO
holding company as well as additional stock awarded/purchased during the first full
post-LBO fiscal year.
d Following Denis (1994), implied sensitivity of options is estimated as 0.6 times the
implied sensitivity of the same fraction stake of common stock.
e Stock is valued at the buyout premium price per share.

Table 12: Selected board composition characteristics for different type of
investor-controlled LBOs for a sample of 64 leveraged buyouts completed
from 1984 to 1989 (medians in parentheses).a

*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
**Statistically significant at the 5% level.
***Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Difference in means and medians between buyout specialist controlled firms and
management controlled firms and between buyout specialist controlled firms and other
outside investor controlled firms is tested. Difference in means tested using a standard
t-test. Difference in medians tested using a Wilcoxon sum rank test. All data collected
within one full fiscal year of LBO completion.
b Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group.
Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts;
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance
a
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companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors,
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards.
c Other includes academics, accountants, consultants, professional directors, lawyers,
and medical professionals.
Table 13: Differences in selected firm characteristics for firms included and
excluded from the final sample for a beginning sample of 125 leveraged
buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (medians reported in parentheses).a
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*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
**Statistically significant at the 5% level.
***Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Difference in means tested using a standard t-test. Difference in medians tested
using a Wilcoxon sum rank test. All data collected within one full fiscal year of LBO
completion except where noted. Subscripted time periods are relative to the LBO
completion date, e.g., t+1=first full fiscal post LBO year; t−1=first full fiscal pre-LBO
year.
b Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts;
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company.
c Includes ESOP financing.
d Other investors include insurance companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit
corporations, individual investors, individually organized limited partnerships, and
miscellaneous corporations. Examples of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau
Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards.
e Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common
stock.
f Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors. The
relation between type of controlling investor and incidence of financial distress is
tested using a Chi-square test.
g Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are
a
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those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt
outstanding is evenly amortized.
h Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing,
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures.
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing+bank
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds].

Table 14: Differences in the relation between debt and equity financing for
firms included and excluded from the final sample for a beginning sample of
125 leveraged buyouts completed from 1984 to 1989 (medians reported in
parentheses).a

*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
**Statistically significant at the 5% level.
***Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Difference in means tested using a standard t-test. Difference in medians tested
using a Wilcoxon sum rank test.
a
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Control is defined as owning 50% or more of the voting common stock. There are six
firms where no one investor owns 50% or more of the voting common stock. In these
cases, control is assigned to the investor with the largest percentage of common
stock. ESOP-controlled LBOs are included in the management-controlled group.
Examples of a buyout specialist in the sample are Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts;
Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd.; and Kelso Company. Other investors include insurance
companies, trusts, commercial banks, credit corporations, individual investors,
individually organized limited partnerships, and miscellaneous corporations. Examples
of miscellaneous corporations are Campeau Corp.; Lowes Corp.; and Hallmark Cards.
c Data on debt amounts of different seniority are the amounts outstanding at the time
the transaction is completed. Senior bank debt includes term loan facilities, revolving
loan facilities, ESOP facilities, tender offer facilities, partnership loans, and other bank
debt excluding bridge financing. Industrial revenue bonds include equipment financing,
collateralized equipment financing, mortgage notes, capitalized lease obligations, and
real estate backed loans. Senior secured notes include senior extendable notes and
senior increasing rate notes. Senior notes include unsecured sinking fund debentures.
Other is the amount classified as other on the financial statements and includes
commercial paper. Average seniority is equal to [(bridge financing + bank
debt)*5+senior secured debt*4+senior debt*3+senior subordinated debt
*2+subordinated debt*1]/[total debt outstanding-other–industrial revenue bonds].
d Average maturity is calculated by summing the estimated principal repayments each
year weighted by the year in which the payment is due and then dividing by the total
amount of debt outstanding. For the first five years, the principal repayments used are
those disclosed in the materials issued to shareholders describing the transaction. For
years six through the year of the longest maturity of the debt, the remaining debt
outstanding is evenly amortized.
e Incidence of financial distress is the number of LBOs where there was either a
bankruptcy filing or a restructuring of the firm's debt where creditors accept less than
full compensation for their original debt position by either reductions in stated interest
or principal, extensions of debt maturity or grants of equity interests to creditors. The
relation between type of controlling investor and incidence of financial distress is
tested using a Chi-square test.
b
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